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Comments

Prisoner Parents: An Argument for
Extending the Right to Procreate to
Incarcerated Men and Women
Jaime Escudert

The United States Constitution protects citizens from being
denied certain fundamental rights and liberties. Included among
these are the right to be free from discrimination,' the right to be
childless,2 the right to marry whomever one pleases 3 and the right
to procreate.' Courts have a "constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect [these] fundamental liberties."
Although states may not deny citizens these liberties outright, they may curtail them significantly in the prison setting."
Indeed, states may completely deny some of these rights to their
prisoners.7 Nonetheless, a prisoner is entitled to exercise all of the
B.M. 2000, Florida State University; J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Chicago
See, for example, Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373 (1886) (finding a regulation
invalid because it "amount[ed] to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of
the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States").
2 See, for example, Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 16 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right
to have an abortion free from state interference during the first trimester).
3 See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) (finding a statute prohibiting interracial marriage to be unconstitutional).
4 See, for example, Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942) (describing
the
ability to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man").' Pell v Procunier,417 US 817, 827 (1974).
6 See Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 545-46 (1979) (holding
several prison policies to be
constitutional).
7 See, for example, Jones v Helms, 452 US 412, 419 (1981) (finding that
prisoners are
not entitled to enjoy the fundamental right of travel).

271

272

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2002:

constitutional rights that are consistent with her status "as a
prisoner" and that are in accord with "the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system." This is true even when the
prisoner's incarceration prevents her from enjoying those rights
fully.9

This Comment addresses whether the Constitution requires
prisons to make reasonable efforts to accommodate an inmate's
right to procreate. While this question has been addressed in the
federal appellate courts, these courts have primarily considered
the issue only as it pertains to male inmates." This Comment
proposes that the right to procreate does survive incarceration
and that equal protection analysis requires that the right be extended to women as well as men.
Part I of the Comment analyzes case law pertaining to a
prisoner's right to procreate. It begins by briefly examining Supreme Court cases that have established procreation as a fundamental right. Part I then discusses cases that have upheld the
exercise of other fundamental rights in the prison setting, as well
as cases that have specifically addressed whether the right to
procreate survives incarceration. Finally, Part I considers cases
that have addressed the issue of gender classification.
Part II argues that, like other fundamental rights, such as
marriage, a state may not deny the right to procreate to its prisoners. Furthermore, the Comment argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to extend this right to female prisoners. A two-pronged approach is
used to make this argument. First, Part II contends that the right
to procreate does survive incarceration. Second, Part II explains
why, assuming that male prisoners have a right to procreate, the
Equal Protection Clause mandates that female prisoners be allowed to exercise this right as well.

Pell, 417 US at 822.
See, for example, Turner v Safley, 482 US 78, 95-96 (1987) (finding that states may
not deny prisoners the right of marriage even though the prison setting necessarily curtails some major benefits of that right).
'0 See, for example, Gerber v Hickman, 264 F3d 882, 891 (9th Cir 2001), revd en banc,
291 F3d 617 (2002) (refusing to address the question of female inmate procreation on the
ground that "[wiomen cannot avail themselves of the opportunity [plaintiffi narrowly
seeks-to provide a semen specimen to his mate so that she can be artificially inseminated").
8
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I. ANALYSIS OF LAW CONCERNING PRISONERS AND THE
RIGHT TO PROCREATE

This part of the Comment provides an overview of the case
law that is relevant to a claim that the right for both men and
women to procreate survives incarceration. Section A discusses
Supreme Court decisions that establish procreation as a fundamental right. Section B addresses instances in which courts have
considered the extent to which certain fundamental rights may
be enjoyed in prison. Section C discusses court decisions specifically concerning procreation in prison. Finally, Section D demonstrates how Supreme Court decisions require that male and female inmates be treated equally.
A. Procreation as a Fundamental Right
Procreation is a constitutionally protected right."
The Supreme Court has placed the right to make decisions regarding
procreation "on the same level of importance as decisions relating
to [marriage], childbirth, child rearing and family relationships.""
Like marriage, it is therefore "of fundamental importance for all
individuals."3
In Eisenstadt v Baird,4 the Court found that the right of privacy prevents the government from unduly interfering with an
individual's decisions regarding procreation." Eisenstadt dealt
with a Massachusetts statute preventing certain individuals
(such as physicians) from giving contraceptive materials to unmarried persons.'" The appellee in Eisenstadt was convicted under this statute after exhibiting and distributing contraceptive
articles to college students. 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the
First Circuit's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional." The
Court found that the statute impermissibly conflicted with the
Equal Protection Clause because it allowed the distribution of
" See, for example, Carey v PopulationServices International,431 US 678, 687 (1977)
(finding that "the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusion by the State").
12 Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 386 (1978).
13
14

Id at 384.
405 US 438 (1972).

is Id at 453.
16 Id at 441-42.
'
Id at 440.
'8 See Eisenstadt, 405 US at 454-55 (holding that "by providing dissimilar treatment
for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated [the laws in question] violate the Equal Protection Clause").
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contraceptive materials to married couples, but prohibited such
distribution to unmarried couples." The Court also found that the
statute interfered with the privacy rights of both married and
unmarried persons.O

The Supreme Court has also ruled that in many cases, statutes prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices to minors are unconstitutional.2" In Carey v Population Services International,n the Court noted that the decision whether or not to
procreate is "at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally
protected choices" upon which the government may not infringe.0
The government may only burden a fundamental right when such
24
action is justified by a "sufficiently compelling state interest.
Even then, the regulation "must be narrowly drawn to express
only those interests. ' " The Supreme Court therefore has consistently recognized procreation as a fundamental right that states
only can infringe upon in exceptional circumstances.
B. Fundamental Rights in Prison
26

Prisoners retain many rights while they are incarcerated.
Nonetheless, incarceration indisputably necessitates restricting
and limiting some of these rights. 2 A state's ability to curtail a
prisoner's rights depends on whether the restriction serves valid

19 Id at 453 ('If under Griswold[v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)] the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible.").
See id ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
21 See Carey, 431 US at 681 (finding unconstitutional
a New York statute prohibiting
sales of contraceptives to minors).
2
431 US 678 (1977).
21
24

Id at 685.

See id at 686 (stating that 'even a burdensome regulation may be validated by a

sufficiently compelling state interest"). See also Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 154 (1973) (finding that certain state interests, such as 'safeguarding health, .... maintaining medical
standards, and.., protecting potential life," may become sufficiently compelling to allow a
state to infringe on the right to an abortion).
25

Id.

26

See, for example, Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 555-56 (1974) (finding that

"[there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country").
2
See Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 545 (1979) (stating that "simply because prison
inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations").
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penological interests.' When determining the validity of penological interests, courts have been hesitant to undermine the judgment of prison officials.' This has been true even in instances
where prison officials have sought to curtail fundamental liberties in the prison setting.9 In Bell v Wolfish,3' for example, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of several practices
employed at a custodial facility in New York City. ' These practices included a requirement that inmates undergo a visual body
cavity search after every contact visit with a person from outside
the prison, including visits with the prisoners' own defense attorneys.' The Court ruled that the prison could constitutionally perform these searches on both prisoners and pretrial detainees. '
Bell shows that while constitutional rights are to be "scrupulously observed, ' " courts understand that the everyday problems
of running a corrections facility are not easily resolved.' As a result, courts have held that it is proper to accord prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security

'8 See, for example, Pell v Procunier,417 US 817, 822 (1974) (finding that a prisoner
is entitled to retain those First Amendment rights "that are not inconsistent with [her]
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system").
'9 See, for example, Pitts v Thornburgh, 866 F2d 1450, 1453 (DC Cir 1989) (stating
that "courts should be loath to substitute their judgment for that of prison officials and
administrators").
30 See, for example, Jones v North CarolinaPrisoners'LaborUnion, Inc, 433 US 119,
125 (1977) (stating that "this Court has long recognized that '[1lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system'), quoting Price v Johnston,
334 US 266, 285 (1948).
31 441 US 520
(1979).
32

Id at 523.

3' Id at 577 (Marshall dissenting).

Id at 558 (stating that "assuming for present purposes that inmates, both convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility ... we nonetheless conclude that these searches do not violate that amendment") (internal citations omitted).
35 Bell, 441 US at 562.
See id at 547 (recognizing that "the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation
of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions"). See also Turner v Safley,
482 US 78, 84-85 (1987) (recognizing that "[riuning a prison is an inordinately difficult
undertaking").
37 Bell, 441 US at 547.

276

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2002:

Of course, this deference does not require courts to blindly
accept the conclusions of prison administrators.38 On the contrary,
courts have a duty to examine contested prison regulations, ensuring that they do not violate fundamental liberties.39 In
Bradbury v Wainright," the Eleventh Circuit questioned the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Florida Department of
Corrections that, among other things, prevented prisoners serving life sentences from marrying." The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the state, observing that the security justifications that the state
put forth were "extremely weak."'
One of the most significant cases concerning the fundamental
rights of prisoners is Turner v Safley,3 in which the Supreme
Court established the current constitutional standard for restricting prisoners' rights. Turner considered a statute similar to the
one at issue in Bradbury and determined that states may not
deny prisoners the right to marry." The Court reviewed the
Eighth Circuit's holding that courts should apply strict scrutiny
when assessing certain prison regulations."8 The Turner Court
rejected this finding on two grounds. First, the Court held that
subjecting the judgments of prison officials to strict scrutiny
would interfere with "their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration." 8 Second, the Court found that requiring
strict scrutiny in prison cases would "distort the decisionmaking
process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to
the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it
had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.4' Rec3' See, for example, Bradbury v Wainright, 718 F2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir 1983) (stating that 'prison administrators' bald assertions of security interests will not justify the
loss of a prisoner's fundamental rights").
'9 See Pell, 417 US at 827 (stating that courts may not "abdicate their constitutional
responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties").
40 718 F2d 1538 (l1th Cir
1983).
4' See id at 1539 ('[Tihe following inmates are not permitted to marry ... [i]nmates
under sentence of life imprisonment and required to serve no less than twenty-five (25)
years before becoming eligible for parole") (quoting Fla Dept of Corrections Rule 33-3.13).
42

Id at 1544-45.

43

482 US 78 (1987).

4 Id at 99.
, See Safley v Turner, 777 F2d 1307, 1314 (8th Cir 1985) (affirming
'the district

court's application of strict scrutiny in evaluating the [prison's] marriage rules"), affd in
part, revd in part, 482 US 78 (1987).
48 Turner, 482 US at 89.
4 Id.
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ognizing that prison administration is a difficult task, the court
adopted a form of rational basis review for infringements on the
fundamental rights of prisoners. Specifically, the Court held that
"when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.""'
In order to determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation, the Court suggested that courts look at four factors. First,
courts should consider whether there is "a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it."' Second, courts should
determine whether "alternative means of exercising the right...
remain open to prison inmates.' Third, courts should consider
the impact that accommodating the asserted constitutional right
"will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally."'' Finally, "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of [the] prison regulation."' The converse is also true: "the existence of obvious, easy
alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable." While these factors do not represent a test that courts
must apply in cases concerning prisoner's fundamental rights,
the Turner court mentioned them because they are "relevant
in
',
determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue.
In the case before it, the Turner Court found that the regulation was not reasonable." While the Court recognized that the
prison setting necessarily limits many of the benefits of marriage,
it found that prisoners may still enjoy important aspects of the
right, such as "expressions of emotional support and public commitment."' The Court also found that the restriction was not reasonable because "[t]here are obvious, easy alternatives to the...
regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a
de minimis burden on the pursuit of security objectives."" Thus,
the Turner Court established that while courts should not exam48

Id.

49 Id, quoting Block v Rutherford, 468 US 576, 586 (1984).

50 Turner, 482 US at 89.
51 Id.
52
53

Id at 90.
Id.

Turner, 482 US at 89.
See id at 91 (finding that the prison's regulation was invalid because it was "an
exaggerated response to [the prison officials'] rehabilitation and security concerns").
'
Id at 95.
54

57

Id at 98.
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ine prison regulations under strict scrutiny, a regulation will be
upheld only if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.
An obvious tension exists in cases that, like Turner and Bell,
attempt to define the scope of constitutional liberties in the
prison setting. On the one hand, courts want prisoners to enjoy
their fundamental rights, but on the other hand, judges do not
want to prevent prison officials from maintaining a safe and secure prison environment. Courts have approached this tension by
reviewing grievances on a case-by-case basis and, when in doubt,
resolving the issue in favor of the prison administrators.0 The
judiciary has stubbornly refused to hold that prisoners have no
rights, however, and has struggled to develop a workable and
constitutionally acceptable system. Decisions subsequent to
Turner, for example, have further clarified the extent to which
prisoners may enjoy the marriage right in prison.59 Such decisions, which attempt to combine fundamental freedoms with the
realities of life in the prison system, reveal the judicial belief that
a prison setting should be capable of both housing inmates and
realizing constitutional liberties.
C.

Procreation in Prison
1. A state's policy of inmate sterilization merits
strict scrutiny.

The principal Supreme Court case outlining the extent to
which the government may involve itself with matters concerning
procreation and prisoners is Skinner v Oklahoma.' There, the
Court examined a statute that required the sterilization of persons convicted two or more times for "crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."'" The plaintiff in Skinner had
been convicted under this statute and, as a result, faced sterilization because of a jury's determination that the procedure would

68 See, for example, Bell, 441 US at 547 (stating that prison administrators "should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies").
59 See, for example, Hernandez v Coughlin, 18 F3d 133, 137 (2d Cir 1994) (finding
that while prisoners have a right to be married, they do not have a right to conjugal visits
while incarcerated).
60 316 US 535 (1942).
6' Id at 536.
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not jeopardize the plaintiff's health. 6' The Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld the jury's finding.'
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oklahoma
court, declaring the statute to be unconstitutional.6 The Court
found the legislation to run "afoul" of the Equal Protection Clause
because it required the sterilization of those who had committed
certain crimes, such as grand larceny, but provided immunity for
those who had committed other similar crimes, such as embezzlement." The Court found that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality
of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment."''
The Court was also keenly aware that the statute made it
possible for the state to destroy an extremely important right 7
Referring to procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of man,"
and "a basic liberty," the Court found that where a sterilization
law is at issue, strict scrutiny is "essential.' 9 This is because such
laws run the risk of allowing the state to discriminate against
certain groups of individuals, preventing them from enjoying
their fundamental rights. ' °
This finding is not at odds with the Court's subsequent ruling
in Turner that strict scrutiny is not appropriate when assessing
prison regulations, because Turner did not deal with the issue of
sterilization. The Skinner Court recognized that a state may use
sterilization laws to discriminate against "groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and
equal laws." In fact, this was the case in Skinner, where the law
laid "an unequal hand on those who [had] committed intrinsically
the same quality of offense."' The Court undoubtedly recognized
62 Id at 537 (stating that "[tihe court instructed the jury that the crimes of which
petitioner had been convicted were felonies involving moral turpitude, and that the only
question for the jury was whether the operation of vasectomy could be performed on petitioner without detriment to his general health").
63

Id at 537.

Skinner, 316 US at 543.
6' See id at 541.
66 Id at 541.
67 See id at 536 (stating that "[t]his case touches a sensitive and important area of
6-

human rights").
68 Skinner, 316 US at 541.
69 Id.
70
71
72

Id.
Id.
Skinner, 316 US at 541.
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that the law at issue was particularly constructed to have a disproportionately negative impact on minority convicts.73 Therefore,
the Skinner Court appears to have accepted the proposition that
sterilization laws are particularly dangerous because if inappropriately applied, they conceivably threaten the continued existence of a particular group. As a result, such laws should be
strictly scrutinized.
2. Judges disagree as to whether the right to procreate
survives incarceration.
While there is general agreement that procreation is a fundamental right, several courts have held that it is not a right that
may be exercised in the prison setting. Although the plaintiff in
Skinner was allowed to preserve his ability to procreate, 7' Skinner
did not determine whether prisoners have a right to engage in
procreation while they are still in prison. Several lower courts
have subsequently addressed this issue and their analyses have
produced conflicting results.
In Goodwin v Turner 7 ' a prisoner brought suit challenging
the Missouri Department of Corrections' refusal to allow him to
artificially inseminate his wife.7 In rejecting the prisoner's request, the prison adopted a policy by which male prisoners would
not be allowed to artificially inseminate their partners.' The policy was based in part on the concern that, for the prison to accommodate artificial insemination, it "would either have to develop collection, handling, and storage procedures for semen or be
opened up to private medical or technical persons to come in to
collect the semen."'1 Prison officials opposed taking these meas73 See id at 537 (stating that the statute in question specifically excluded
from its
scope "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses").
74 See id at 541 (stating that "[iln evil or reckless hands, it can cause races
or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear").
7'See, for example, Percy v New Jersey Department of Corrections, 651 A2d 1044,
1047 (NJ App 1995) (finding that, while inmates have the fundamental right to procreate,
the state may prevent them from doing so due to valid penological concerns).
76 Skinner, 316 US at
541.
77 Compare Goodwin v Turner, 908 F2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir 1990) (finding
that a
prison need not allow inmates to procreate), with Gerber, 264 F3d at 890 (concluding that
"the fundamental right to procreate survives incarceration").
78 908 F2d 1395 (8th Cir 1990).
7' Id at 1397-98.
80 See id at 1397 (quoting Bureau's policy providing that
"sound correctional policy
dictates against allowing inmates to artificially inseminate another person").
81

Id.
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ures because they believed that allowing such activity inside the
prison would either "require a significant drain on resources or
create significant security risks."2
The prisoner challenging the Bureau's policy proposed a procedure that involved depositing semen into a clean container,
which would then immediately be frozen by on-site medical personnel and transported to his wife for purposes of fertilization."
The prisoner argued that he could not wait until his release date
to inseminate his wife because, by that time, the risk of her having a child with a chromosomal abnormality would have increased."2 The prisoner agreed to pay all of the expenses associated with the procedure."
The Goodwin court declined to decide whether the right to
procreate survives incarceration.' Despite recognizing procreation as a "fundamental right," the court upheld the policy of the
Bureau of Prisons on the ground that allowing the plaintiff to
artificially inseminate his wife would result in unequal treatment
between male and female prisoners." The court noted that the
Bureau's policies did not allow male inmates to artificially inseminate their partners without allowing female prisoners to be
artificially inseminated as well.' The court found that, while
prisons can meet the procreative requirements of male inmates
with relatively little difficulty, females require specialized services that prisons cannot provide.' The court also found that the
cost of providing these services to female inmates would unacceptably burden the Bureau's financial resources.90 In reaching
this conclusion, the court neither addressed the fact that the
82 Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1397.

Id.
Id.
8 See id.
8 See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1398 (stating that "we need not decide whether Goodwin's
right to procreate by means of artificial insemination actually survives incarceration").
87 See id at 1399 (finding that the challenged regulation is "rationally related to the
Bureau's interest of treating all inmates equally to the extent possible").
88 See id at 1400 (stating that "[wie merely note that as a matter of the Bureau'sestablished prisonpolicy, and not as a matter of constitutional law, if male inmates are allowed
to procreate, the Bureau will either be forced to accord some similar benefit on its female
inmates or compromise its legitimate policy").
89 See id (noting that accommodation would "force the Bureau to grant its female
inmates expanded medical services").
9o See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1400 (stating that "[tihe significant expansion of medical
'

services to the female population and the additional financial burden of added infant care
would have a significant impact on the allocation of prison resources generally and would
further undercut the Bureau's limited resources for necessary and important prison programs and security").

282

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2002:

plaintiff in Goodwin offered to bear all the expenses himself' nor
ruled on the possibility that female inmates who wanted to procreate might legitimately be allowed to do the same. Instead, the
Eighth Circuit confined its analysis to the Bureau's policy and
held that the Bureau had a legitimate penological interest in not
allowing male prisoners to procreate.2
In 2001 a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit found that
incarceration does not extinguish the right for men to procreate
(the "panel" decision)." The plaintiff in Gerber was serving a life
sentence in the California Department of Corrections ("CDC").94
The plaintiff petitioned the CDC to allow him to artificially inseminate his wife." Like the prisoner in Goodwin, the Gerber
plaintiff offered to pay all of the costs associated with the procedure." The CDC denied his request and the district court upheld
the CDC's decision.97 The appellate panel reversed the district
court's decision, finding that the district court had "erred by concluding that the right to procreate does not survive incarceration."

The appellate panel began its analysis by noting that procreation is a fundamental right.' The panel then found that
states may address valid penological interests only by imposing
restrictions on inmates that are less restrictive than a complete
ban on procreation.'0° While it may be appropriate for prisons to
restrict actual physical contact between prisoners and members
of external society, modern technology allows procreation to occur
without such contact. The panel determined that allowing male

See id at 1397 (noting that "Goodwin did inform prison officials that he would bear
all financial costs of the procedure").
92 See id at 1400 (holding that "the Bureau's restriction on inmate procreation is reasonably related to furthering the legitimate penological interest of treating all inmates
equally, to the extent possible").
93 Gerber v Hickman, 264 F3d 882, 884 (9th Cir 2001) (concluding that "the right to
procreate survives incarceration"), revd en banc, 291 F3d 617 (9th Cir 2002).
94 Id.

9 See id at 885.
96 See id.
" See Gerber v Hickman, 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 1218 (E D Cal 2000) (holding that
"[w]hatever right plaintiff has to artificial insemination, it does not survive incarceration").
9" Gerber, 264 F3d at 892.
9 See id at 892 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental
constitutional right to procreate on several occasions").
'oo See id at 890 (noting that although the "fundamental right to procreate survives
-incarceration," the exercise of that right is "subject to restriction based on legitimate penological interests").
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prisoners to use alternative methods of procreation is reconcilable
with valid penological concerns."'
The panel rejected the CDC's argument that allowing male
inmates to provide semen specimens would expose the prison to
an unacceptable risk of liability-either by mishandling of the
specimen, or because of suits brought by women who want to be
artificially inseminated.' 2 The panel found this argument "reprehensible" because it suggested "that restricting protected fundamental constitutional rights is justified by fear of increasing a
party's liability. " " The panel ultimately held that since the state
had failed to make an adequate showing that allowing the prisoner to procreate would unreasonably interfere with legitimate
penological interests, the prison could not deny him the right.'
This result was in accord with the panel's additional finding that
the right for men to procreate survives incarceration.""
The initial appellate decision in Gerber was overruled after
an en banc rehearing by eleven judges from the Ninth Circuit
(the "en banc" decision)."' The majority disagreed with the appellate panel's finding that procreation survives incarceration."7 In
the majority's view, "[a] holding that the State of California must
accommodate Gerber's request to artificially inseminate his wife
as a matter of constitutional right would be a radical and unprecedented interpretation of the Constitution."'" The dissent,
which consisted of five judges, responded to the majority's argument by stating that neither "prisons nor courts should deny a
reasonable request for the exercise of a constitutional right simply because it is novel."'5°

'01 See id at 892 (concluding that, "on the basis of the record before us, none of the
rationales offered by the Warden falls within Turner's proscription-that the prison may
only deny a constitutional right if the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.') quoting Turner, 482 US at 89.
'o2 See Gerber, 264 F3d at 891.
"03

Id at 892.

Id (holding that the rationales offered by the Warden 'fail under the first factor
discussed in Turner: there is no 'valid rational connection' between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it").
105 See id at 890 (holding that "the fundamental right to procreate survives incarceration").
"'6 See Gerber, 291 F3d 617, 619 (9th Cir 2002) (affirming
the decision of the district
104

court).
107

tion").
"'8

See id at 622 (concluding that "the right to procreate is inconsistent with incarcera-

Id at 623.

'09 Id at 628 (Tashima dissenting), quoting Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1407 (McMillian
dissenting).
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Goodwin and both the panel and en banc Gerber decisions
can be seen as examples of how the judiciary's view of prisoner
procreation has evolved in the sixty years since Skinner. Skinner
considered whether the state may sterilize inmates, thus destroying their fundamental right to procreate."' Goodwin and the two
Gerber decisions address the extent to which a prison must accommodate a prisoner's desire to procreate. The Goodwin court
suggested that the right to procreate may survive incarceration,
but the court declined to decide the issue outright."' Gerber's
panel decision went further, finding that the right to procreate
does survive incarceration, therefore suggesting that prisons
must allow male inmates to procreate when they cannot show a
valid penological interest for preventing such procreation." Although the panel decision in Gerber was reversed, the reversal
was only achieved by a vote of six to five. This shows that in the
minds of many appellate judges, the constitutional appropriateness of banning all inmate procreation is not a foregone conclusion.
D. Gender Distinctions under the Equal Protection Clause
In both Goodwin and Gerber, prison officials argued that allowing male prisoners to procreate was impossible because they
would then be required to allow female prisoners to procreate as
well.13 The Goodwin court declined to address whether the Constitution would prevent a prison from extending the right to procreate to male inmates without also extending the right to female
inmates."' Instead, the court based its decision on the fact that
the Prison Bureau's self-imposed policy would have required such
"0 See Part I C 1.
. See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1396 (refusing to decide the issue of whether the right to
procreate survives incarceration because, "even assuming Goodwin's right to procreate
survives incarceration, the Bureau's restriction is reasonably related to its penological
interest of treating all prisoners equally, to the extent possible").
12 See Gerber, 264 F3d at 890 (concluding that "the fundamental right of procreation
survives incarceration," but that the exercise of that right is 'subject to restriction based
on legitimate penological interests").
13 See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1400 (addressing the Bureau's policy
statement, noting
that were the Bureau were forced to allow male prisoners to procreate, it would "have to
confer a corresponding benefit on its female prisoners"). See also Gerber, 264 F3d at 891
(describing the Warden's claim that "permitting a prisoner to provide a semen sample
would create an unacceptable risk of liability for the prison ... [because of] ... suits by
women inmates seeking to be artificially inseminated").
1
See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1400 (stating that '[wie do not hold that if the Bureau
allows Goodwin to procreate, then it must as a matter of constitutional law allow its female inmates to procreate").
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a result."' The court thus left open the question of whether allowing male and female inmates to procreate in prison may be appropriate under certain conditions. Similarly, Gerber's panel decision avoided the prison's argument that the state would unacceptably infringe on the equal protection rights of female prisoners if it allowed male inmates to procreate."" Instead, the court
simply noted that the question of female procreation was not before it."7 The Supreme Court's gender discrimination case law,
however, suggests that a prison system that allows male inmates
to procreate must also allow its female inmates to do the same,
unless it can show that it has an "exceedingly persuasive" reason
for not doing so."8
Supreme Court decisions concerning gender equality have
made clear that in order for a classification based on gender to be
constitutionally valid, it must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."" 9 The Court has
also noted that sex classifications "are inherently suspect and
must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny."'20 The exact
standard that courts should apply in gender discrimination cases
was clarified in J.E.B. v Alabama,"' where the Court held that
"gender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive
" 21
justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.

...See id (noting that "as a matter of the Bureau's establishedprison policy, and not as
a matter of constitutional law, if male inmates are allowed to procreate, the Bureau will
either be forced to accord some similar benefit on its female inmates or compromise its
legitimate policy").
"6 See Gerber, 264 F3d at 891 (noting that "[tihe Warden's equal protection argument
assumes matters not before the court").
11 See id (stating that "[wiomen cannot avail themselves
of the opportunity Gerber
narrowly seeks... [tiherefore, the policy of treating inmates 'equally to the extent possible' is not implicated").
118See United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 531 (1996) (stating that "[plarties who
seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action").
119 Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano
Co v Virginia, 253 US
412, 415 (1920).
120 Frontierov Richardson, 411 US 677, 682 (1973) (finding
unconstitutional a statute
providing that spouses of female members of uniformed services qualify as dependents
only if they are in fact dependent for over one-half of their support, whereas spouses of
male members automatically qualify).
121 511 US 127
(1994).
22 Id at 136, quoting PersonnelAdministratorof Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256,
273 (1979).
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The most recent Supreme Court case to employ the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard is United States v Virginia.'2 In Virginia, after a female student who wished to gain
admission to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI"), an all-male,
publicly-funded university, filed a complaint, the United States
brought an Equal Protection suit against the Commonwealth of
Virginia and VMI.' In an attempt to appease females who
wished to attend VMI, Virginia established the Virginia Women's
Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), an all-female undergraduate
college that shared VMI's mission of producing "citizen soldiers. '""
The Virginia Court however, did not find VWIL to be a constitutionally valid substitute for VMI because, in the Court's view,
Virginia had failed to prove that VWIL was VMI's equal.' 2" In addition, Virginia was unable to show an "'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier
training afforded by VMI..'' The Court's holding in Virginia reveals that gender classifications will not pass constitutional muster unless the state can show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for implementing the classification. While the exact
strictness of this standard is unclear, the Court did state that
"[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on
the State."'" Additionally, it is not enough for the state to merely
claim that its gender distinctions are made in furtherance of
some legitimate state interest. The state must prove that its policies achieve their intended goal. ' 2 While the state's interests do
have some merit, they must give way to the Constitution's
greater interest in ensuring equality between the sexes.' 30 Thus,
such regulations can stand only if they are based on an "exceedingly persuasive" justification.
12
1

"

518 US 515, 533 (1996).
Id at 520, 523.

Id at 526.

See id at 551 (stating that "[i]n myriad respects other than military training, VWIL
does not qualify as VMI's equal").
127 Virginia, 518 US
at 534.
'"'
Id at 533.
'2
See Frontiero, 411 US at 689 (stating that "[i]n order to satisfy the demands of
strict judicial scrutiny, the Government must demonstrate, for example, that it is actually
cheaper to grant increased benefits with respect to all male members than it is, than it is
to determine which male members are in fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only to those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement").
'30 See id at 690 (stating that while "efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency"), quoting Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 656 (1972).
126
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II. INMATE PROCREATION IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THAT MAY
PRACTICALLY BE EFFECTUATED
Prison officials frequently make two arguments for why prisoners should be denied the right to procreate. These are (1) allowing prisoners to procreate impermissibly compromises the valid
penological interests of maintaining prison safety and conserving
prison resources; 3 ' and (2) even if inmate procreation could be
performed without violating penological interests, the law does
not require prison officials to allow procreation in the prison setting. 3 ' Each of these arguments is addressed in sections A and B
below. Section C demonstrates why states are constitutionally
required to allow female as well as male inmates to enjoy their
procreative right.
A. Procreation While Incarcerated Will Not Unreasonably
Strain Prison Security Measures or Financial Concerns.
1. Security may be maintained even when outside medical
personnel are required to enter a prison.
In the past, prison officials could validly claim that allowing
prisoners to procreate would have posed serious prison safety
concerns. Prior to the development of artificial insemination and
egg harvesting technologies, allowing a prisoner to procreate
would have required leaving an outsider alone with the inmate.
Obviously, such a situation is potentially dangerous. Consequently, courts widely recognize that prisoners do not have a
right to engage in certain activities, such as conjugal visitation,
that would necessarily leave them unsupervised." Modern technology now makes it possible for male inmates to procreate without coming into physical contact with another person, however,
and female inmates would require only minimal contact. It therefore seems increasingly inappropriate for prison officials to argue
that safety concerns prohibit any sort of prisoner procreation
from taking place.
131

See, for example, Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1397 (stating the prison's argument that

allowing inmate procreation "would either require a significant drain on resources or
create significant security risks").
132

See, for example, Gerber, 264 F3d at 885 (stating the prison's argument that "the

right to procreate does not survive incarceration").
13 See, for example, Hernandez v Coughlin, 18 F3d 133, 137 (2d Cir 1994)
(finding
that "even though the right to marriage is constitutionally protected for inmates, the right
to marital privacy and conjugal visits while incarcerated is not").
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Male inmate procreation may be effectuated through artificial insemination, "one of the oldest methods of assisted reproduction."" This process requires only a clean container and a means
by which to speedily ship semen (which may need to be medically
frozen) out of the prison. ' As far as females are concerned, procreation without actual physical contact with another person may
be achieved through a method called egg harvesting or surrogate
motherhood. In this process, medical personnel collect the inmate's eggs, fertilize them in vitro and then implant them into
the womb of a surrogate mother.3 ' As one scholar has found,
"[slurrogacy is becoming quite common.'. 7 Furthermore, another
scholar has found that this method might be suitable in the
prison setting because it "creates negligible administrative inconvenience."'3
An obvious security concern raised by both of these procedures is that they will likely require outside medical personnel to
enter the prison. While it seems reasonable for prison officials to
desire to keep as few people from entering and leaving the prison
as possible, courts have routinely held that prisons must admit
outside personnel when the Constitution so requires. For example, in the recent case of Jones'El v Berge,' mentally ill inmates
in a supermaximum security prison sought a preliminary injunction, claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated
the Eighth Amendment.' ° Finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled facts that could lead to success on a claim of cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the
,14Anastasia Grammaticaki-Alexiou, Artificial Reproduction Technologies and Conflict
of Laws: An InitialApproach, 60 La L Rev 1113, 1114 (2000).
'
See Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1397 (describing plaintiff's proposed procedure for artificially inseminating his wife).
131 See Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Comment, Marriage, Procreationand the Prisoner:
Should Reproductive Alternatives Survive DuringIncarceration?,5 Touro L Rev 189, 209 n
136 (1988). See also Grammaticaki-Alexiou, 60 La L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 134) (describing surrogate motherhood as a process by which "[one] woman offers to gestate the
embryo produced either by [in vitro fertilization of another] woman's egg using her husband's or a donor's sperm, or by artificial insemination").
13 Alison Harvison Young, New Reproductive Technologies in Canadaand the United
States: Same Problems, Different Discourses, 12 Temple Intl & Comp L J 43, 77 (1998).
18 See DeOliveira, Comment, 5 Touro L Rev at 209-10 (cited in note 133) (describing
the technology of surrogate motherhood and stating that "the majority of inmates should
retain [marital and procreative] rights, because they do not interfere with safety, security,
or prison administration").
139 164 F Supp 2d 1096 (W D Wis 2001).

140 See id at 1116 (stating that "the case that plaintiffs have made is that the decision
to place a seriously mentally ill inmate at Supermax is an Eighth Amendment violation in
and of itself').
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court granted the preliminary injunction. 4' Specifically, the court
ordered the warden of the prison to allow independent medical
personnel onto the premises in order to evaluate the mental
health of certain groups of inmates.
In Jones v Wittenberg,' another case brought by inmates, the
court found that the conditions of incarceration in an Ohio prison
were inappropriate under the Eighth Amendment. ' " In order to
remedy this situation, the court required that the prison allow
inmates to undergo dental examinations and treatment.' 41 Obviously, this order could not be carried out unless prisoners were
permitted to personally meet with outside personnel, a potentially hazardous requirement. Nonetheless, both Jones and
Jones'El show that courts have required prisons to allow these
activities in order to meet the medical needs of their prisoners.
Prison officials also argue that prisoner procreation creates
an impermissible security risk by providing the inmates with objects that they could use to harm or harass other incarcerated
individuals. 146 This argument ignores the fact that in many cases
prisoners are already allowed to possess, or be in the vicinity of,
instruments that could possibly be used in an improper fashion.
For example, the requirement in Jones that prisoners be allowed
to undergo dental examinations necessarily also meant that the
prisoners be allowed near dental implements, several of which
might easily be used as weapons. Additionally, the court in Jones
required the prison to furnish inmates with toothbrushes and
shaving gear, '' which are also capable of being used improperly.

See id at 1120-21 (stating that "plaintiffs have more than a negligible chance of
success in demonstrating that the conditions at Supermax are sufficiently serious").
142 See id at 1126 (stating that "defendants are directed
to arrange for mental health
professionals not employed by the Department of Corrections to perform evaluations immediately").
141

143330 F Supp 707 (N D Ohio
1971).
14 See Jones v Wittenberg, 323 F Supp

93, 99 (N D Ohio 1971) (stating that "[i]f the
constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishment has any meaning, the
evidence in this case shows that it has been violated").
141 See Jones, 330 F Supp at 718 (requiring, among other
things, that defendants provide "[aldequate facilities for dental examinations and treatment, both curative and preventative").
'46See, for example, Gerber, 264 F3d at 891 (detailing Warden's concern that "the
procedure for collecting semen would create an unacceptable risk that prisoners would
misuse their semen").
147 See Jones, 330 F Supp at 718 (mandating that
"[e]ach prisoner who does not bring
such items with him when he enters the jail shall be furnished with soap, toothbrush,
toothpaste, and shaving gear so as to be able to maintain good personal hygiene").
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Therefore, courts recognize that certain prisoners may be trusted
to use specific items in the proper manner.
2. Courts will impose financial burdens on prisons in order

to preserve constitutional rights.
In addition to security concerns, prison officials are extremely worried about straining their financial resources. For
example, in cases in which male inmates have tried to assert
their right to procreate in prison, prison officials have argued
that courts should not grant the right because prisons do not
have the financial ability to accommodate the same right in females.' Courts have employed two approaches regarding this
issue: they have either agreed with prison officials,"" or they have
left the issue open for resolution in a subsequent case.u In cases
concerning other fundamental rights in prison, however, courts
have held that, despite financial concerns, prisons must provide
inmates with certain services and facilities.
First, courts have ruled that, where a constitutional right is
concerned, economic factors cannot justify its total denial. 1 Thus,
courts have not allowed prisons to claim that it is not economically feasible for them to provide prisoners with access to legal
materials,1 2 or in the case of female inmates, access to abortion
facilities. Despite the fact that economic factors can become central to affirmative remedies for constitutional inadequacies, "such

148Gerber, 264 F3d at 891 (noting Warden's argument that granting women the
opportunity to be artificially inseminated would lead to "'obvious' and 'prohibitive'
burdens"); Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1397 (quoting prison policy stating that allowing
prisoners to artificially inseminate their spouses "would require a significant drain on
prison resources"); Percy v New Jersey Departmentof Corrections,651 A2d 1044, 1046 (NJ
App 1995) (noting that -[i]f female prisoners had the right to artificial insemination, the
financial burdens and security concerns would be quite significant inside the prison").
149 See, for example, Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1400 (holding
that the challenged regulation
is rationally related to the legitimate penological interest of treating all inmates equally).
"0 See, for example, Gerber, 264 F3d at 891 (stating that the equal protection argument assumes matters not before the court).
1' See Monmouth County CorrectionalInstitutional Inmates v Lanzaro, 834 F2d 326,
337 (3d Cir 1987) (stating that "where conditions within a prison facility are challenged as
constitutionally inadequate, courts have been reluctant to consider costs to the institution
a major factor in determining whether a constitutional violation exists").
"2 See, for example, Myers v Hundley, 101 F3d 542, 544 (8th Cir 1996) (stating that
"prisons must provide inmates with some access to legal materials or to legal assistance").
153 Lanzaro, 834 F2d at 336-37 (finding that county's policy of denying access to, and
funding for, elective abortions cannot be justified by its asserted administrative and economic considerations).
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considerations ordinarily cannot justify imposition of a restrictive
regulation that infringes on a constitutional right."'"
Second, courts have been willing to impose extreme financial
burdens on prisons when they have determined that prisoners
are being denied their constitutional rights.' In Tillery v
Owens,'6 plaintiffs brought an action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging that the conditions of confinement at the State Correctional
Institution at Pittsburgh ("SCIP") were unconstitutional" Agreeing with the plaintiff, the court ordered a litany of costly changes
to occur. Among others, these measures included temporarily reducing the number of inmates housed at SCIP, hiring additional
corrections officers," 9 installing fire safety measures,'6 hiring consultants to advise the prison on making necessary changes to the
medical facilities,"' establishing a separate housing unit (which
included a full-time psychiatrist) for mentally ill inmates,1 6 hiring
a cardiologist to periodically examine inmates with cardiovascular disease,"' and finally, hiring a prison monitor to ensure that
all of these changes actually took place.'6 Even though the implementation of these changes would be costly, the court ruled
that they were necessary because SCIP fell below constitutional
standards."'
Id.
See, for example, Jones, 330 F Supp at 713 (suggesting that it might be appropriate
for the sheriff to "reduce his expenditures for police activities to whatever extent might be
necessary to provide for the proper operation of the County Jail").
1'5 719 F Supp 1256 (W
D Pa 1989).
"67 See id at 1259 (stating that "[t]his Section
1983 class action challenges the
constitutionality of the conditions of confinement at [SCIP]").
'8See id at 1274 (stating that where there are constitutionally inadequate cells that
must be replaced, "[t]his will undoubtedly mean a reduction in the SCIP inmates at least
during the renovation").
"'9 See id (requiring defendants to "take immediate steps to eliminate double-celling
...by hiring sufficient additional corrections officers").
160 See Tillery, 719 F Supp at 1280 (requiring defendants to "provide the Court with a
plan to ensure that inmates.., are reasonably safe from the dangers of fire").
161 See id at 1303 (requiring Commonwealth to pay reasonable costs of
consultants to
review draft plans).
162 See id (noting that 70 percent of the states have special needs units, and stating
that "W[to meet constitutional requirements, SCIP, as the regional center for receiving,
identifying and housing severely mentally ill inmates, should establish such a unit").
'6 See id at 1307 (noting that "in contrast to basic medical care standards, no cardiologist regularly visits the institution" and stating that "[a] cardiologist should be retained
to examine periodically those inmates identified as having cardiovascular disease").
'6
See Tillery, 719 F Supp at 1309 (noting that "[tihe task of maintaining liaison with
counsel, the various parties and the staff of the institution will be too great for the court
by itself," and thus appointing "an individual to serve as prison monitor in this case, that
person to be paid by defendants").
1'

15

"'5 See id at 1259.
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Similarly, the Jones court ordered several costly measures.
These included reducing the inmate population," correcting the
jail lighting system,16' ordering the sheriff to train additional
prison personnel," allowing dental examinations,169 and ordering
that all incoming inmates undergo medical examinations.170
Tillery and Jones therefore show that prison officials are not
permitted to deny prisoners' enjoyment of their constitutional
rights on the ground that implementing those rights is beyond
the prison's financial means.
Finally, it is important to note that, despite their assertions
to the contrary, prisons need not necessarily be responsible for
financing the prisoner's costs related to procreation. Significantly,
male inmates have brought several cases in an attempt to secure
their right to procreate in prison and in several of these cases the
inmates were willing to finance the cost of the procedure out of
their own pocket."' While one might argue that requiring inmates
to pay for the costs of their medical procedures out of pocket will
have a disproportionate impact on female inmates, this is not
necessarily the case. It is true that the artificial insemination
procedure may be less costly for men then the harvesting procedure is for women. Nonetheless, it is still appropriate for prisons
to require women to pay for the procedures they require. This is
because viewing procreation as an act that occurs between two
members of the opposite sex, the cost of the procedure borne
equally by both men and women, regardless of which partner is
imprisoned.
In cases where inmates are not willing to finance the procedures associated with procreation, prisons still may not be obli1
gated to pay. The Supreme Court's decision in Rust v Sullivan,
suggests that, while the state may not impermissibly curtail a
fundamental right, it has no obligation to finance an inmate's

16 Jones, 330 F Supp at 714 (stating that "[tihe first change which must be made is a

reduction of inmate population").
167 See id at 715.
1'6 See id (noting that "[c]ontrol of many of the problems in the jail is dependent upon
having an adequate number of properly trained guards on duty in the jail at all times").
169 See id at 718.
170 See Jones, 330 F Supp at 718 (requiring that "[elvery entering prisoner must receive a medical examination before being assigned to a regular cell").
171 See, for example, Gerber, 264 F3d at 885; Goodwin,
908 F2d at 1397; Percy v New
Jersey Departmentof Corrections,651 A2d 1044, 1045 (NJ App 1995).
172 500 US 173 (1991).
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enjoyment of that right.' Thus the argument that prisons cannot
afford to finance inmate procreation fails because case law suggests that prisons may legitimately
require inmates to pay the
174
procedure.
the
of
full cost
B.

The Constitution Requires That the Right to Procreate Be
Extended to Male and Female Inmates

The state has a legitimate interest in limiting the right of
inmates to procreate. However, an absolute ban on prisoner procreation is a broader restriction than is necessary to satisfy those
interests. This is true even after Turner, which found that a
prison regulation that impinges on a prisoner's constitutional
rights will be upheld as long as it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."1 75 The fact that an absolute ban on
prisoner procreation is unconstitutional becomes evident once the
burden of accommodating artificial insemination and egg harvest-

ing in the prison setting is measured against the factors that the
Turner Court suggested lower courts apply when 7determining the
6
reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation.1
First, under Turner, the prison must show a rational connection between the regulation and the government interest put
forth to justify it. 7 In Gerber, the prison officials opposed allowing procreation on the grounds that to do so would compromise
prison security and would stress the prison's financial resources."" These concerns are questionable given the reality of the
requirements of artificial insemination and egg-harvesting procedures.
173 See id at 201 (stating that "[tihe Government has no constitutional
duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally protected").
174This is not to say that inmates could be made to pay costs contingent to the
procedure, such as additional security measures or the addition of new facilities. These additional costs are not specific to any individual inmate, but rather are an inevitable consequence of allowing inmates to enjoy their right to procreate. An inmate should therefore
not be expected to shoulder these financial burdens any more than inmates are expected
to bear the additional costs associated with the enjoyment of other fundamental rights,
such as the security costs connected with allowing inmates to enjoy their right to counsel.
175 Turner, 482 US at 89.
176 See id at 89-90 (listing "several factors [that] are relevant in determining the rea-

sonableness of the regulation at issue"). See also text accompanying notes 48-53.
177 See id (stating that "[flirst, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it").
178 See Gerber, 264 F3d at 885, (stating that the Warden moved to dismiss on the basis
that "the restriction on artificial insemination is reasonably related to the legitimate penological goals of... conserving prison resources, [and] maintaining institutional security
interests").
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Allowing a male inmate to artificially inseminate his partner
requires him to do little more than ejaculate into a clean container. " While it is possible that an inmate might behave improperly while performing this function, there is no reason to believe that an inmate who has a legitimate interest in procreating
would do so. Indeed, the panel decision in Gerber dismissed the
prison's unsupported assertion that a male inmate might misuse
his semen while performing this procedure as "argumentative.""
As for female inmates, harvesting would require the inmate
to be around medical personnel, but it is difficult to see how prisons may reasonably consider this to be a security concern if the
procedure were limited, for example, only to inmates that have
been convicted of non-violent crimes, or who have not displayed
any violent behavior during their incarceration. Obviously, a
prison should not be obligated to extend the right of procreation
to inmates that it reasonably believes will abuse the right. Thus,
given the fact that a prison need only extend to right of procreation to inmates that have a legitimate interest in exercising it, a
prison's ability to successfully argue that it meets the first of the
Turner factors seems dubious.
The second factor proposed by the Turner Court was whether
there is an alternative means for the inmate to exercise his
right."' By definition, a prison's absolute ban on prisoner procreation has the practical effect of absolutely preventing a prisoner
from reproducing while they are incarcerated. When such a ban is
in place the prisoner's only possible option is to wait until he or
she is released from prison in order to exercise his or her procreative right. Obviously, this is not a meaningful opportunity for
prisoners serving life sentences. Often, it is also an inadequate
remedy for those who have to spend even a shorter period of time
in prison. A female inmate who has been sentenced to prison for
twenty years, for example, could easily be released after it is possible for her to safely bear children. Male inmates also potentially
have this problem, for, as was the case in Goodwin, the inmate
may not be scheduled for release until such a time when it is no

179 See id (stating Gerber's assertion that once a medical facility mailed him a suitable
container, all that is required is to "ejaculate into the receptacle, place it into the return
mailer, and send it by overnight mail back to the laboratory").
180 Id at 891.
181 See Turner, 482 US at 90 (stating that a second factor "is
whether there are alter-

native means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates").
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longer advisable for his partner to have a child.18' Therefore, an
absolute ban on prisoner procreation leaves some prisoners with
no alternative means to exercise their right. Thus, such regulations fail under the second factor in Turner.
Third, before allowing a right to be enjoyed in prison, courts
should consider the impact that accommodating the right will
have on the general prison environment.'8 Undoubtedly, allowing
prisoner procreation could have a negative impact on the prison
generally. Prisoners could potentially try to take advantage of the
right in order to effectuate escape or even possibly to harm other
prisoners or prison personnel. Given these possibilities, prisons
should only be required to allow prisoner procreation through
minimally intrusive methods, such as artificial insemination and
egg harvesting. Prisons should also be allowed to enforce certain
restrictions on the right, such as only extending it to wellbehaved inmates. In short, if given sufficient latitude, prison officials should be able to devise a system by which inmates can enjoy their fundamental right to procreate with minimal impact on
the overall prison setting.
It is also worth noting that allowing inmate procreation may
actually decrease safety risks within the prison. This is because
the overall behavior of inmates may improve once they learn that
only well-behaved inmates will be permitted to exercise their
right. Furthermore, the general goal of preventing crime may be
furthered by allowing inmates to procreate, as some evidence
suggests that recidivism occurs less frequently among inmates
who have families in the outside world than it does among inmates with no such family obligations."
Finally, a prison regulation may be considered reasonable
where there are no ready alternatives to the procedure adopted

'8' See, for example, Goodwin, 908 F2d at 1396 (stating that Goodwin and his wife 'do
not want to delay conception until his release because of their concern about the increased
risk of birth defects as a result of increasing maternal age").
'8 See Turner, 482 US at 90 (stating that "[a] third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally").
"" See Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent: UnconstitutionalRestrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 NYU L Rev 275, 294 (1985) (citing study
showing that "marriage and other close family ties during imprisonment can reduce recidivism"); See also Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Comment, 5 Touro L Rev at 207 (cited in
note 136) (hypothesizing that "[t]he chance to have children and the hope that one day the
prisoner will be able to share more fully in the experience of parenthood could serve as a
strong impetus to rehabilitation and a desire to reject criminal behavior as a way of life").
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by prison administrators.8'5 On the other hand, "the existence of
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is
not reasonable.""m Artificial insemination and egg harvesting represent such alternatives because they allow inmates to engage in
the activities necessary for procreation without leaving the inmates alone with outside individuals, thereby avoiding the risks
associated with the traditional manner of procreating. Applying
the potential dangers of prisoner procreation to the factors in
Turner therefore suggests that in some form, prisoner procreation
can be accommodated in the prison setting.
In Gerber's en banc decision, the majority attempted to sidestep Turner by removing the technology issue from the debate
over prisoner procreation altogether." According to the majority,
their conclusion that procreation does not survive incarceration
did not stem from scientific considerations.8 8 Instead, the court's
decision was made in "consideration of the nature and goals of the
correctional system, including isolating prisoners, deterring
crime, punishing offenders, and providing rehabilitation."88
This analysis seems to disregard the spirit of Turner, however. The Turner Court required prisons to allow inmates the
right to marry, noting that many attributes of marriage are "unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate
corrections goals."" This seems to suggest that, to the extent that
they do not interfere with legitimate prison concerns, fundamental rights in addition to marriage should be permitted to exist in
prison. As the dissent in Gerber's en banc decision stated "because of the technology of artificial insemination ... procreation
can be achieved without compromising security."'.. As a result,
under Turner, inmate procreation by means of artificial insemination and egg harvesting should be allowed.
In addition to Turner, other case law provides support for the
conclusion that regulations prohibiting all procreation by inmates
8' See Turner, 482 US at 90 (stating that "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation").
'

Id.

See Gerber, 291 F3d 617, 622 (9th Cir 2002) (stating that "[o]ur conclusion that the
right to procreate is inconsistent with incarceration is not dependent on the science of
artificial insemination, or or on easy or how difficult it is to accomplish").
lag Id (stating that the court's analysis would not change even if "science progressed
to
187

the point where Gerber could artificially inseminate his wife as easily as write her a let-

ter").

8'

Id.

190Turner, 482 US at 96.
'9' Gerber,291 F3d at 625 (Tashima dissenting).
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are unreasonable and inappropriate. One such case is Skinner,
which held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute providing for
the sterilization of certain criminals.192 While the Court over-

turned the statute on equal protection grounds, the Court was
obviously troubled by the fact that application of the statute resulted in sterilization.' 9 Although the Court's opinion does not
state it explicitly, there is language in Skinner indicating that the
Constitution does not permit states to sterilize inmates outright.'" Denying prisoners the right to procreate often has the
practical effect of sterilizing inmates, particularly those who are
serving long sentences.' 9 This concern is especially pertinent to
female prisoners, since females normally lose their ability to reproduce at an earlier age than males do. Consequently, the policy
of preventing inmates from procreating appears to be in conflict
with the Supreme Court's ruling.
It is true that the constitutionality of sterilization regimes
generally was not ultimately decided in Skinner.'" Nonetheless,
cases subsequent to Skinner have established that the state may
not sterilize its citizens without first providing adequate procedural protections.97 Even in the Supreme Court's famous ruling in
Buck v Bell, 9 ' in which the Court upheld a Virginia involuntary
sterilization statute, the Court recognized that the statute at issue had several procedural safeguards in place. "

'9' See Skinner, 316 US at 541 (finding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute allowing
the sterilization of certain criminals).
'93 See id at 541 (stating that procreation is "fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the [human] race").
194 See, for example, id (stating that "[t]he power to sterilize,
if exercised, may have
subtle, farreaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to whither and disappear. There is no
redemption for the individual touches. Any experiment which the state conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.").
'95 See Kristin M. Davis, Note, Inmates and Artificial Insemination:A New Perspective
On Prisoners'Residual Right to Procreate,44 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 163, 191
(1993) (concluding that "refusing [death row inmates] access to artificial insemination
with its de minimis impact on penological interests, would amount to constructive sterilization and thereby raise the reproductive concerns noted by the Skinner Court").
1
See Skinner, 316 US at 543 (leaving it to the Oklahoma Supreme Court to decide in
the first instance whether the sterilization regime would be constitutional if altered so as
to remove the Equal Protection objection).
19, See, for example, Vaughn v Ruoff, 253 F3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir 2001) (stating that
"[siterilization results in the irreversible loss of one of a person's most fundamental rights,
a loss that must be preceded by procedural protections").
198

274 US 200 (1927).

' See id at 206 (noting that the statute at issue had procedures in place to "protect[
the patients from possible abuse").
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Currently there are no procedural safeguards in place to determine if incarcerating a certain individual will lead to "constructive sterilization," for example. Prisons do not determine if
females will be released past an age where they will physically be
able to conceive children. To allow this deprivation to occur without procedural safeguards seems to be at odds with the constitutional mandate that individuals be allowed to enjoy "their Due
Process Clause right to be free from coerced sterilization without
appropriate procedures.'
Turner, Skinner and their progeny provide a compelling argument that the right to procreate survives incarceration. As was
stated in Gerber's panel decision, "[tiaken together, Turner and
Skinner suggest that the fundamental right of procreation may
exist in some form while a prisoner is incarcerated.'... In addition,
the Supreme Court has held that marriage and procreation are
rights of equal importance."2 The Court has also held that prisons
may not deny inmates the right to marry.2 3 Central to the decision in Turner was the Court's finding that prisons could accommodate the right to marry without overburdening penological
concerns, such as prison safety.2" The logical conclusion of these
holdings is that where prisoner procreation does not overburden
penological concerns, prisons must also accommodate a prisoner's
right to procreate.
Of course, rights are "subject to substantial restrictions as a
result of incarceration.' 2 For example, the Turner Court made a
point of noting that its decision did not hold that married inmates
are entitled to all of the benefits of marriage.2 The Court did
note, however, that those housed in prisons can enjoy many of the
intangible benefits of marriage, such as the spiritual significance

200 Vaughn, 253 F3d at 1129.

...Gerber, 264 F3d at 889.
'0' See Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 386 (1978) (stating that "the decision to marry
has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, child
birth, child rearing, and family relationships").
203 See Turner, 482 US at 99-100 (holding unconstitutional a Missouri
statute permitting an inmate to marry only with the permission of the prison superintendent, and providing that such approval should only be given "when there are compelling reasons to do
so").
204 See id at 98 (stating that "[there are obvious, easy
alternatives to the Missouri
regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a de minimis burden on
the pursuit of security objectives").
20' Turner, 482 US at
95.
206 See id (stating that "the right to marry, like many other
rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration").
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of the act. 7 The same can be said of the right to procreate. While
valid restrictions may prevent the prisoner from fully enjoying
the experience of traditional parenting, there are many intangible benefits that a prisoner can experience, such as the satisfaction of watching her child mature into adulthood. Incarceration
need not significantly diminish the satisfaction an individual can
derive from being a parent.
Since technological and medical advances mean that prisoners of both sexes may now procreate without coming into physical
contact with another person, the argument that allowing prisoner
procreation poses undue safety risks (especially for minimum security and/or non-violent prisoners) seems suspect. 0 8 Furthermore, the argument that prisons cannot afford to allow prisoner
procreation seems tenuous given the fact that courts insist that
prisons provide inmates with constitutional rights even where
doing so is costly."
C. The Equal Protection Clause Requires That Female Prisoners Be Allowed to Enjoy the Right to Procreate
Prison officials should not be allowed to deny the right of procreation to either male or female prisoners. This is because egg
harvesting and sperm donation are roughly equivalent procedures, ° both of which are becoming more and more commonplace. 1 ' As such, for a prison to argue that it cannot allow male
procreation because female procreation would also be required is
inappropriate.
Under the current law, such an argument should fail for
three reasons. First, given the fact that both sperm and egg donation are minimally intrusive procedures, a prison will have a difficult time arguing that the distinction between them is not solely
gender-based, but rather is supported by an exceedingly persua20' See id (stating that "[miany important attributes of marriage remain, however,
after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life").
m See Part II A 1.
209 See Part II A 2.
210 See Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is

There InternationalConsensus in the Debate Over Assisted Reproductive Technologies?, 19
Houston J Intl L 147, 155 (1996) (stating that "[e]gg donation is the female equivalent of
artificial insemination").
211 See Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle In a Decedent's
Eye: Proposed
Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67
Temple L Rev 335, 359 (1994) (stating that "[siperm is routinely donated and egg donation
is becoming increasingly more common").
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sive justification. The distinction would therefore be inappropriate under Virginia.12 Undeniably, egg harvesting is more difficult
to effectuate than sperm donation, but the fact that women have
different requirements when it comes to procreation is not something that can or should be avoided. It is understood that "women
may need treatment different than that accorded to men in order
to effectuate their membership in important spheres of social
life.' 1" Prisons must accept the procreative differences that exist
between men and women and accommodate them because "in a
society constitutionally committed to equality, the reality of biological difference ... should not be permitted to justify state action exaggerating the consequences of those differences.' 1"
The second reason that the Equal Protection arguments put
forth by prison officials in both Gerber and Goodwin come into
conflict with constitutional law is that they sound precisely like
the kind of post hoc justification that the Virginia court explicitly
rejected." 5 In neither Goodwin nor Gerber was there any indication that the prison officials had ever considered allowing male or
female prisoners to procreate. For the prison officials to argue
that they derived their policy of preventing male inmates from
procreating from their inability to reasonably accommodate female procreation seems disingenuous. As the Virginia Court
found, the state may not justify differentiating between men and
women by making an argument that it developed in response to
litigation."6 The Equal Protection arguments put forth by the
prison officials in Goodwin and Gerber, seem to have been developed for precisely the purpose of opposing the litigation and
should therefore be rejected under Virginia.
Finally, a prison policy that only extends the right of procreation to its male inmates would have to overcome a strong pre-

212

See Virginia, 518 US at 531 (stating that "parties who seek to defend gender-based

government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that
action").
213 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279, 1299

(1987).
214

Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 1003

(1984).

215 See Virginia, 518 US at 533 (stating that "[the justification
must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females.").
216

Id.
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sumption of invalidity.' A prison should not be able to overcome
this burden because allowing both male and female inmate procreation does not place an onerous burden on a prison."' Thus, a
prison may not continue to prevent its inmates from enjoying this
fundamental right.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has made three arguments. First, allowing
prisoner procreation would not impermissibly impose on a
prison's ability to administer itself. The argument to the contrary
is at odds with court decisions that routinely require prisons to go
to great lengths in order to adequately meet constitutional requirements. Second, the right to procreate survives incarceration.
Male and female inmates must therefore be allowed to procreate.
Third, despite their physical differences, both male and female
inmates must be permitted to enjoy this right. Allowing only one
sex to enjoy the right of procreation would constitute gender discrimination. Such discrimination may only be upheld upon a
showing of an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the distinction. There seems to be no such justification here.
Prison officials will face numerous problems when they are
required to allow inmate procreation. Indeed, the challenges facing a prison administrator who must allow prison procreation are
so formidable that one can hardly blame prison officials from
balking at the idea of accommodating even the relatively simple
task of male procreation. The law, however, does not exist for the
purpose of making one group of people comfortable, nor does the
Constitution protect only those rights that are easily obtained.
The actual implementation of the requested change may be burdensome and costly, but once it is determined that the change
may reasonably be effectuated, cost and burden should no longer
dictate the availability of the privilege. Applying a less demanding standard is not appropriate when it comes to ensuring that
all citizens enjoy their fundamental rights.

217 See id at 532 (noting that the Supreme Court has "carefully inspected official action
that closes a door or denies opportunity to women").
218 See Part II A 1.

